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ABSTRACT: This article analyses the importance of labour market institutions and, in particular, 
collective wage bargaining in shaping regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. 
Using microdata from the Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey, our results reveal that there are 
significant inter-regional wage differences for similarly skilled workers. These differences are 
present throughout the whole wage structure and can be explained by both competitive and non-
competitive factors, such as an insufficient competition in product markets. In this context, 
industry-level collective bargaining plays a major role in accounting for regional wage differences, 
a role that in the Spanish case is enhanced due to its unusual regional dimension.  
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RESUMEN: Este trabajo analiza la importancia de las instituciones del mercado de trabajo y, en 
particular, el sistema de negociación colectiva en la explicación de las diferencias salariales 
regionales en el mercado de trabajo español. Los resultados obtenidos a partir de información 
microeconómica de la Encuesta de Estructura Salarial muestran la existencia de apreciables 
diferencias salariales entre las regiones españolas para trabajadores con habilidades productivas 
observadas similares. Estas diferencias salariales están presentes a lo largo de toda la estructura 
salarial y se explican por factores competitivos y por factores no competitivos, como la insuficiente 
competencia en el mercado de productos. En este contexto, la negociación colectiva sectorial es en 
gran medida la responsable de la diferenciación salarial entre territorios, lo que resulta facilitado 
por la vertiente territorial que caracteriza al sistema español de negociación colectiva  
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1. Introduction 
 
Regional wage differences for similarly skilled workers occur in developed countries 
with markedly different institutional settings (Teulings and Hartog, 1998).1 The 
magnitude and nature of these wage differentials have, potentially, major implications 
on the working of the labour market. If regional wage differentials are competitive and 
wide enough, wages can act as signals for efficient labour allocation between regions. 
If, on the other hand, certain factors prevent the emergence of regional differences (or 
generate non-competitive differences), the equalisation of the marginal productivity of 
similarly skilled workers across the regions is impeded and wages do not adapt properly 
to differences in local labour market conditions causing a distorting effect in the 
allocation of labour.  
 
An important issue in this context is the extent to which wage differentials across the 
regions are conditioned by wage-setting labour market institutions. Statutory minimum 
wages and, in particular, collective bargaining are major factors in wage determination 
and, in practice, they have a strong influence on the wage structure of developed 
countries (Blau and Kahn, 1999 and Nickell and Layard, 1999). Consequently, these 
factors also have an influence on the magnitude and nature of inter-regional wage 
differentials. In this sense, the European Union stresses the need to change the systems 
of collective bargaining and wage determination that, inasmuch as they do not vary 
from one territory to another in most EU member states, might result in regional wage 
structures that are  inflexible and fail to adjust to local labour market conditions 
(Eurostat, 2003). In this context, the OECD (2004) also highlights the need to analyse 
“whether certain organisational forms of collective bargaining undermine employment 
performance by tending to result in (…) a compressed wage structure which does not 
adequately reflect differences in productivity between workers and regions”. 
 
The aim of this article is to analyse inter-regional wage differentials in the Spanish 
labour market and to establish their relationship with industry-level collective 
bargaining. We consider the Spanish case to be of great interest within this context for 
several reasons. First, Spain is one of the few EU countries in which collective 
                                                          
1 A more general analysis of territorial disparities in labour markets can be found in OECD (2000) and 
Eurostat (2002). 
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agreements at branch level apply just to provinces or regions and in which industrial 
collective bargaining operates at an infra-national scale (EIRO, 2000). Furthermore, 
available evidence strongly suggests that the type of industrial collective bargaining 
influences the magnitude of inter-regional wage differentials (Simón and Russell, 
2004), since these differences are much more marked in Spain than in other European 
countries (namely, Belgium and Italy) where industrial collective bargaining agreements 
are conducted nationally, or even in those with decentralized systems of collective 
bargaining where industrial collective bargaining does not occur (Britain). Second, 
microdata describing industry minimum wages fixed by collective agreements at branch 
level - i.e. the binding wage scales in the Spanish labour market - are exceptionally 
available for the Spanish economy. We can therefore examine the real influence of 
collective bargaining on regional wage differentials. The insights offered by this data 
constitute a significant novelty as regards existing studies in the literature on wage 
determination. 
 
Previous studies analysing regional wage differences based on modern theories of wage 
determination are somewhat scarce. Blackaby and Manning (1987) and Blackaby and 
Murphy (1991) undertook the first studies of this kind, but there has been little 
continuity, with the sole exception of Mullen and Williams (2001). This article seeks to 
advance this line of research by exploring the role that collective bargaining plays in 
shaping inter-regional wage differentials. Although our analysis is limited to this wage-
setting institution, we believe that this choice is largely supported by the empirical 
findings in the literature. 
 
The main contribution of our article to the current literature comprises the use of 
microdata in directly examining the influence of minimum wages established by 
industry-level collective bargaining on the determination of regional wages. To the best 
of our knowledge, empirical evidence on this issue does not exist. This can largely be 
explained by the scarcity of information on industry minimum wages in European 
countries where industry-level collective bargaining prevails.2 
                                                          
2 There are, however, some important exceptions. Dolado et al. (1997) and Lorences et al. (1995) 
examine the characteristics of industry minimum wages and their influence on wage determination in 
Spain using limited samples of branch collective agreements. In turn, Cardoso and Portugal (2003) infer 
industry minimum wages for the Portuguese economy from the distribution of actual wages and analyse 
their determinants. 
4 
This article is structured as follows. After this introduction, the second section estimates 
the regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. The third section examines 
the degree of similarity in industry minimum wages and actual wages across the 
Spanish regions. The fourth section identifies those factors that account for inter-
regional wage differentials and the extent to which they correspond to competitive 
explanations of wage determination. The article ends with a summary of the results 
reported and discusses the main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis.  
 
2. Inter-regional wage differentials in Spain 
 
In this section, we estimate Spanish inter-regional wage differentials using cross-section 
microdata drawn from the Structure of Earnings Survey 1995 (Encuesta de Estructura 
Salarial; hereinafter SES) carried out by the Spanish National Statistics Office (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística). The SES is a national sample of salaried workers from randomly 
selected firms. As the SES comprises a sample of workers at each firm, it consists of 
matched employer-employee data with a wealth of information on factors concerning the 
characteristics of the individual, job and workplace. The SES covers Spanish firms 
employing at least ten workers in economic activities different to agriculture and fisheries 
and in various service activity branches. After an initial filter of individuals with missing 
information, those with extremely high and low hourly wages, workers in Ceuta and 
Melilla, and those with an apprenticeship contract were also filtered out. The final sample 
comprised 156,009 workers. The wage concept is the natural logarithm of the gross hourly 
wage. This is calculated as the ratio of gross pay and the number of hours worked per year. 
Gross pay does not include overtime or bonuses for shift work, night work and/or weekend 
work. 
 
Our approach to the analysis of inter-regional wage differentials follows the standard 
procedure in the inter-industry wage literature pioneered by Krueger and Summers (1988) 
and improved by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997)3. In other words, we estimate a 
cross-section Mincerian wage equation by restricted least squares of the form: 
 
    wij = α + Xiδ + Zjβ + Ejγ + εij           (1) 
                                                          
3 An application of this procedure can be found in Hirschberg and Lye (2001). 
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Where wij denotes the natural logarithm of the gross hourly wage of worker i in region j; Xi 
stands for a vector of individual and job controls which are described below; Zj includes a 
set of mutually exclusive dummies which cover all regions (there are 17 regions in Spain); 
Ej indicates a vector of establishment controls; α is the intercept; δ, β and γ are vectors of 
the parameters to be estimated; and εij is a random disturbance term.  
 
The individual controls include a gender indicator and a set of standard human capital 
variables that comprise an individual’s general education (measured as the highest 
educational qualification achieved), potential experience and its squared value and the time 
spent with the current employer and its squared value. Potential experience is measured as 
current age minus age on first entering the labour market after leaving full-time schooling. 
Unfortunately, experience has to be approximated because, as is usual in most datasets, we 
are unable to measure actual experience and this cannot be inferred from the information 
available in our data. Job controls are dummies for occupational group, a dummy for an 
indefinite duration contract and a dummy for full-time job. Workplace controls are 
industry dummies (the data report industry affiliation at the two-digit NACE 
nomenclature), firm size dummies and bargaining regime indicators (three types of 
collective agreements are considered: industry-level collective agreements at a regional 
level, industry-level collective agreements at the national level and firm-specific 
agreements). 
 
β is the vector of parameters of interest to us in this study. Since the cross-product matrix 
of regressors of the equation (1) is not one of full rank, the subsequent linear constraint is 
imposed: ∑
j
njβj=0, where nj is the employment share in region j. As in this constrained 
model every region is assigned a dummy variable (which would produce a singularity in 
an unconstrained model with a constant term), the restriction on the weighted sum of the 
region coefficients allows the model to be estimated. Furthermore, it enables us to obtain 
unbiased standard errors of the coefficients (Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt, 1997). The 
reported region coefficients may be interpreted as (approximately)4 the proportionate 
difference in wages between a worker in a region and the average worker with similar 
productive and job and workplace characteristics across all regions. 
                                                          
4 Percentage difference is calculated as (eβj –1)*100, where βj is the relevant coefficient. 
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The standard deviation of the regional wage differentials measures their overall variability: 
 
    SD(β)= ∑ ∑−
j j
jjjj nn
22 σβ                     (2) 
 
Where 2jσ  are the variances of the estimated region coefficients, βj, and SD(β) gives the 
employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation of the βj‘s. The second term in the 
equation corrects for the fact that inter-regional wage differences are estimated with an 
ordinary least squares sampling error that could overestimate the standard deviation of the 
differentials.  
 
The first column in Table 1 reports inter-regional wage differentials estimated with the full 
set of controls.5 A group significance F-test shows that the null hypothesis that regional 
wage differentials jointly equal zero can be rejected at better than the 1% level. Moreover, 
most of the regional dummy coefficients are statistically significant at conventional 
significance levels (the exceptions are the non-significant coefficients of Aragon and the 
Balearic Islands), so that wages in almost every Spanish region typically differ from the 
national average wage. Regional wage premia range from under 15% in Extremadura to 
over 9% in the Basque Country6 and their employment-weighted adjusted standard 
deviation is of 0.075 log points7. Simón and Russell (2004) estimated the magnitude of 
wage differentials between regions in several developed countries (Italy, Belgium, the 
United Kingdom and Spain) with harmonised microdata from the European Structure of 
Earnings Survey 1995, and adopting the same methodology applied in this study.8 The 
employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation of the region differentials was of 0.028 
log points in Belgium (with three regions being considered); 0.030 in Italy (ten regions); 
                                                          
5 The estimated wage equation appears to be meaningful as the returns on the personal and workplace 
characteristics are consistent with those in the literature on wage determination. Full results are not 
reported, but are available from the authors on request.  
 
6 This implies that actual wages in Basque Country are about 28% higher than in Extremadura for all skill 
levels. 
 
7 If regional dummies are further interacted with individual controls the adjusted standard deviation of 
regional coefficients remains fairly similar. Assuming in the specification of the Mincerian wage equation 
that relative wage differences over skills are the same for each region is not, thus, a strong assumption. 
 
8 The SES is the Spanish national sample of the European Structure of Earnings Survey 1995, a grouping 
of national surveys conducted by the statistical offices of the European Union countries according to a 
standard methodology designed by Eurostat.  
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0.052 in Britain (eleven regions) and 0.067 in Spain (seven regions). This comparative 
evidence shows that regional wage differentiation is widespread in the Spanish labour 
market. 
 
Table 1 
Inter-regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. 1995. 
Actual wages 
(Structure of 
Earnings Survey) 
Industry minimum wages 
(NUTS II and NUTS III 
industry-level collective 
agreements) Region 
Coefficien
t 
Standard 
error Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Andalusia -0.008 ** 0.003 -0.011 * 0.004 
Aragon -0.004  0.004 -0.049 ** 0.008 
Asturias -0.030 ** 0.004 0.024 * 0.011 
Balearic Islands -0.003  0.005 0.080 ** 0.022 
Canary Islands -0.084 ** 0.004 -0.034 ** 0.009 
Cantabria -0.024 ** 0.004 -0.022  0.007 
Castilla-La Mancha -0.062 ** 0.004 -0.076 ** 0.005 
Castilla y León -0.041 ** 0.003 -0.059 ** 0.012 
Catalonia  0.078 ** 0.002 0.055 ** 0.005 
Comunidad Valenciana -0.022 ** 0.003 -0.025 ** 0.006 
Extremadura -0.148 ** 0.006 -0.143 ** 0.012 
Galicia -0.142 ** 0.003 -0.102 ** 0.006 
Madrid  0.079 ** 0.002 0.016 * 0.008 
Murcia -0.122 ** 0.004 -0.039 ** 0.011 
Navarra  0.080 ** 0.004 0.113 ** 0.012 
Basque Country  0.090 ** 0.003 0.177 ** 0.007 
Rioja -0.016 ** 0.006 0.056 ** 0.015 
Adjusted standard deviation 0.075 0.080 
Observations 156,009 5,632 
Note: Regional dummy coefficients measure differences relative to the national 
average wage and were estimated using restricted least squares in equations (1) and 
(2). ** and * indicate that the variable is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
The first column in Table 2 reports quantile regression estimates of region premia wage 
differentials at different points in the wage distribution (namely, the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th 
and 90th percentiles).9 Results indicate that highly significant inter-regional wage 
differentials exist throughout the wage structure spectrum and that their dispersion is quite 
similar across different parts of the wage distribution. The same results hold when different 
                                                          
9 Quantile regression techniques allow the impact of a variable on particular points of the conditional 
distribution of wages to be estimated, given the other explanatory variables in the model. This contrasts 
with OLS, which estimates the conditional mean of wages given the explanatory variables. For a 
discussion of quantile regressions, see Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Buchinsky (1994). 
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occupations are considered. Yet, interestingly, noticeable differences emerge as regards the 
type of collective agreement. Wage differentials between territories are much more marked 
for workers covered by branch-level collective agreements at the regional level (the 
adjusted standard deviation of regional wage differentials is in this case of 0.096) than for 
those covered by a national branch agreement (0.053) or a firm-specific agreement (0.067). 
The influence of industry-level collective bargaining at the infra-national level on the 
shaping of regional wage differentials in the Spanish labour market is, thus, quite 
compelling. 
 
 
Table 2 
Adjusted standard deviation of inter-regional wage differences and correspondence 
between the regional differences in actual and bargained wages 1995. 
 
Adjusted standard 
deviation 
Correspondence 
between regional 
differences in 
bargained and 
actual wages 
ALL WORKERS 0.075** 0.822** 
   
PERCENTILE   
Percentile 10 0.076** 0.834** 
Quartile 25 0.074** 0.871** 
Median 0.076** 0.848** 
Quartile 75 0.079** 0.779** 
Percentile 90 0.081** 0.677** 
   
OCCUPATION   
Labourers 0.083** 0.748** 
Manual qualified workers 0.080** 0.861** 
Administrative workers 0.060** 0.729** 
Technicians 0.075** 0.703** 
Medium and highly qualified workers 0.064** 0.599** 
Managers 0.100** 0.665** 
   
TYPE OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT   
National 0.053** 0.727** 
Regional 0.096** 0.843** 
Firm-specific 0.067** 0.748** 
Note: The values in the left-hand column are the adjusted standard deviations of the 
coefficients of the regional dummy variables estimated from wage equation (1). As 
indicated in the table, these differentials were estimated for the whole sample but also for 
different groups of workers, and in different percentiles of the distribution of individual 
wages. ** indicates that wage differences are statistically different from zero with a 
significance level lower than 1%. The right-hand column shows the value of Pearson’s 
bivariate correlation coefficient of the regional dummy coefficients estimated in wage 
equations (1) and (2). ** and * indicate that the correlation is statistically significant at 
the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, in a bilateral test. 
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An additional issue to note is that the pattern of inter-regional wage differentials is largely 
similar across occupations and in different parts of the distribution, as shown by the high 
and significant bivariate correlations of those differentials (Tables 3 and 4). This finding 
confirms that low- and high-wage regions in Spain generally present this feature for all 
types of worker. 
 
 
Table 3 
Correspondence of inter-regional wage differences by occupational groups. 
Structure of Earnings Survey 1995. 
 
Labourers 
M
anual qualified 
w
orkers 
A
dm
inistrative 
w
orkers 
Technicians 
M
edium
 and 
highly qualified 
w
orkers 
M
anagers 
Labourers 1 0.925** 0.910** 0.724** 0.865** 0.739** 
Manual qualified workers  1 0.883** 0.769** 0.752** 0.720** 
Administrative workers   1 0.846** 0.855** 0.749** 
Technicians    1 0.746** 0.846** 
Medium and highly qualified workers     1 0.796** 
Managers      1 
Note: The values of Pearson’s bivariate correlation coefficient for each pair of coefficients of the 
regional dummy variables in the different estimations of wage equation (1) for each occupational 
group. ** and * indicate that the correlation is statistically significant at the 1% and 5%, 
respectively, in a bilateral test. 
 
 
Table 4 
Correspondence of inter-regional wage differences in the different percentiles 
of the wage structure. Structure of Earnings Survey 1995. 
 Percentile 10 
Q
uartile 25 
M
edian 
Q
uartile 75 
Percentile 90 
Percentile 10 1 0.976** 0.901** 0.787** 0.675* 
Quartile 25  1 0.969** 0.892** 0.800** 
Median   1 0.974** 0.912** 
Quartile 75    1 0.975** 
Percentile 90     1 
Note: The values of Pearson’s bivariate correlation coefficient for each 
point of the wage distribution of the coefficients of the regional dummy 
variables in the different estimations of wage equation (1) for each 
percentile. ** and * indicate that the correlation is statistically significant at 
the 1% and 5%, respectively, in a bilateral test. 
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In order to analyse further the significance of the region in determining wage levels, a 
wage variance breakdown was carried out. This is based on the estimation of different 
specifications of the wage equation (1), and it enables us to separate total wage variance 
into different components, after separately regressing individual wages on a set of regional 
dummies, on individual and workplace controls and on both sets of attributes. Based on the 
coefficients of determination of the above wage regressions, this technique allows us to 
distinguish absolute and marginal fractions of wage variance explained by regions (see the 
note to Table 5). Regions actually explain a non-negligible proportion of the variance of 
individual wages, between 1.8 and 6.8%.10 Yet, the relative influence of the region on 
wage determination varies sharply with the type of collective agreement. In fact, it is much 
more important for workers covered by industry-level collective agreements operating 
regionally (in this case the region accounts for between 3.9 and 10% of individual wage 
variability) than for those covered by a national branch (0.9 to 4%) or a firm-specific 
agreement (1.6 to 4.4%). This evidence confirms that regional wage variability is strongly 
related to the structure of industry-level collective bargaining.  
 
 
Table 5 
Regional and individual wage variability in the Spanish labour market. 
Structure of Earnings Survey 1995. 
 
Variability of individual wages 
explained by the region (%) 
 
Minimum bound
( 22 BA RR − )x100
Maximum bound 
( 2CR )x100 
ALL WORKERS 1.8  6.8 
   
TYPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT 
  
National 0.9 4.0 
Regional 3.9 10.0 
Firm-specific 1.6 4.4 
Note: 2CR , 
2
BR  and 
2
AR  are the values of the goodness of fit coefficient in three 
different specifications of the wage equation including, respectively, the following 
explanatory variables: regional dummies, only the rest of explanatory variables in 
equation (1), and both sets of variables. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Note that the territorial influence on wage determination may be underestimated. Regional information 
in the SES refers to the Spanish regions, whilst a wider territorial variability is highly plausible at the 
province level (the 17 Spanish regions divide into 50 provinces), to the extent that this finer territorial 
reference is the usual reference in non-national collective agreements in Spain. 
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3. Industry-level collective bargaining and regional wage differentials 
 
This section of the article analyzes the influence of industry-level collective bargaining on 
regional wage determination in the Spanish labour market. In order to put the analysis into 
context, it begins with a brief description of the Spanish collective bargaining system. 
Then, after estimating regional differences in minimum wages, this pattern is compared 
with that of actual wages. 
 
As noted above, collective bargaining and statutory minimum wages are prominent wage-
setting institutions. In practice countries with centralised collective bargaining systems 
and/or with a national minimum wage tend to have more compressed wage structures 
(Blau and Kahn, 1999 and Nickell and Layard, 1999). The Spanish statutory minimum 
wage (Salario Mínimo Interprofesional) is among the lowest (relative to the median or 
average wages) of all developed countries (OECD, 1998). As it is also systematically 
lower than wage floors set by industry-level collective agreements, it is not actually a 
binding wage floor. Furthermore, it does not vary between regions. For this reason, this 
institution is expected to have only a minor influence on the shaping of regional wage 
differences in the Spanish labour market. As regards the Spanish system of collective 
bargaining, its main features correspond roughly with those of the centralised systems of 
other European Union countries (EIRO, 2002). Thus, the most important level of 
bargaining is branch-level bargaining (although firm-level bargaining also exists); 
coordination between the different units of negotiation is noticeable (although it is slightly 
less intense than in other European Union countries: Nickell and Layard, 1999) and the 
coverage rate is high (85-90%), largely because collective agreements extend by law to all 
suitable workers and firms. An unusual feature of the Spanish system, however, is that 
industry agreements usually operate at an infra-national level, and typically take effect at 
the province level, while, with just a few exceptions, in other European countries in which 
industry-level bargaining is prevalent, industry agreements cover the entire economy 
(EIRO, 2000). 
 
Industry agreements set wage floors for every occupation (categoría profesional) which, as 
noted above, constitute the binding minimum wages in the Spanish labour market. These 
minimum wages differ greatly from one agreement to another within occupations, with 
particularly large inter-regional differentials (Lorences et al., 1995 and Simón, 2001a). 
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According to available empirical evidence, they also have a strong influence on the actual 
wage structure of the Spanish labour market (Dolado and Felgueroso, 1997 and Simón, 
2001b).  
 
A collective bargaining system in which the effects on wage determination are high and 
where most of the industry-level collective agreements operate at an infra-national level 
lends credibility to the argument that inter-regional wage differences in the Spanish labour 
market might well be influenced by industry minimum wages. This possibility can only be 
examined thanks to the availability of a database with microdata on industry minimum 
wages for the Spanish labour market that covers the same industries and the same year, 
1995, as the EES.11 The analysis is constrained to collective agreements operating at an 
infra-national level. 
 
Inter-regional differences in industry minimum wages are estimated using a wage equation 
in which the dependent variable is the agreed wage and the explanatory variables are 
region dummies and occupation and industry controls: 12 
 
    tij = α + Ciδ + Zjβ + Sjγ + εij                              (3) 
 
Where tij denotes the natural logarithm of the minimum wage of occupation i in collective 
agreement j; Ci stands for a vector of occupation controls;13 Zj includes a set of mutually 
exclusive regional dummies which cover all regions; Sj indicates a vector of industry 
controls; α is the intercept; δ, β and γ are vectors of the parameters to be estimated; and εij 
is a random disturbance term.  
 
The empirical results confirm that industry agreements at an infra-national level set 
minimum wages that differ from one region to another for the same industry and 
occupation (Table 1). A group significance F-test shows that the null hypothesis that 
                                                          
11 More details on the database can be found in Simón (2001c). 
 
12 As in Section 2, the equation is estimated by restricted least squares, with the constraint that the 
employment-weighted sum of the regional dummy coefficients equals zero. As long as the information 
available on the number of workers covered by each industry agreement is not reliable, the employment 
weights used are those derived from the Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa).  
 
13 Seven occupations are considered: university degree, non-university degree, skilled white collar  semi-
skilled white collar, skilled blue collar, semi-skilled blue collar, and unskilled blue collar. 
13 
regional wage differentials in agreed wages jointly equal zero can be rejected at better than 
the 1% level. Industry minimum wages in almost every Spanish region differ significantly 
from the national average, with the only exceptions of Murcia and Cantabria. Regionally 
agreed wage premia range from a low of under 14% in Extremadura to a high of over 18% 
in the Basque Country and the employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation of the 
region differentials is of 0.080 log points. 
 
Inter-regional differences in actual and agreed wages are roughly similar in dispersion (the 
adjusted standard deviation is of 0.080 and 0.075 log points) or in pattern (the bivariate 
correlation coefficient is of 0.8 and statistically significant), which reveals the strong 
influence of industry-level collective bargaining in shaping regional wage differentials. 
This influence is particularly marked independent of the type of worker and throughout the 
whole wage distribution (Table 2). Furthermore, this evidence is consistent with the fact 
that differences between industry-level collective agreements in industry minimum wages 
are largely similar for all kinds of worker (Simón, 2001c). The similarity recorded in the 
inter-regional differences in actual and agreed wages is especially significant for workers 
covered by industry agreements operating at an infra-national level. Yet, the fact that the 
relationship is also significant for those workers covered by a firm-specific or a national 
branch agreement requires an explanation. Firm-specific agreements improve industry 
minimum wages through a typical wage drift mechanism, so inter-regional differences in 
industry minimum wages very plausibly spread to wages set in this level of collective 
bargaining. On the other hand, to the extent that industry wages in a region are particularly 
influenced by the wages set in the other industries in the same region (Jimeno and 
Bentolila, 1998 and Bajo et al., 1999), spillover effects in regional wage determination 
from those industries covered by regional collective bargaining to those covered by 
national collective agreements may well account for this latter effect.  
 
Annual changes in industry minimum wages are very similar in all the regions of Spain 
(Alonso and Izquierdo, 1999). As a result, inter-regional differences in industry minimum 
wages can be expected to be roughly the same from one year to the next, which is 
consistent with the time persistence of inter-regional differences in actual wages 
(Villaverde and Maza, 2002) and, finally, with a non-transitory influence of collective 
bargaining in shaping regional wage differences. 
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In short, the overall empirical evidence clearly suggests that inter-regional wage 
differences in the Spanish labour market are driven by industry-level collective bargaining. 
It is, therefore, important for us to determine whether these wage differentials correspond 
to a competitive wage determination mechanism. This matter is examined in section 4 
below. 
 
4. The nature of the regional wage structure 
 
Regional wage differences can be related to the existence of a competitive labour market, 
in which wages act as signals for the efficient reallocation of labour by migration. 
Alternatively, wage differences can also be related to non-competitive factors that impede 
the equalisation of the labour marginal productivities of similar workers living in different 
regions. In this second case, wages would distort the efficient allocation of labour and this 
could have adverse effects via unemployment and income inequality (OECD, 2000). 
 
Competitive explanations of permanent inter-regional wage differences are based on 
labour supply characteristics – human capital, regional price characteristics, compensatory 
differences (Rosen, 1986), or differences in the amenities of the different regions that 
equalise the utility of workers between them (Blackaby and Murphy, 1991 and OECD, 
2000). The other regional wage differences that do not affect workers’ utility should 
disappear through labour and capital mobility (Blackaby and Manning, 1987).  
 
The inter-regional wage differences for Spain estimated in the previous section are for 
workers with similar human capital levels and their geographical structure does not seem 
to be transitory. For this reason, wage differences would only be competitive in nature if 
they were related to differences in price levels or other non-monetary factors. In order to 
test this possibility, we re-estimated the wage equation (1) substituting the regional 
dummies with the price level for each region and with other regional variables related to 
non-monetary factors. Thus, equation (1) is replaced with the following model: 
 
  wij = α + Xiδ + Rjβ + Ejγ + εij          (4) 
 
Where Rj represents the different variables related to the aforementioned characteristics 
of region j. 
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However, the theoretical results reported by Moulton (1986) show that in models such 
as (4) the use of OLS would cause an upward bias in the values of the t-statistic for the 
explanatory variables defined at a higher level of aggregation than that of the 
endogenous variable. For this reason, equation (4) is estimated using Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) following Rauch (1993). The estimation process is 
specifically focused so as to obtain a consistent estimation of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the error term (taking into account its regional structure) as well as to use this 
matrix to transform the original data properly and obtain efficient estimates for the 
coefficients considered. 
 
The logarithm of the regional price level presented the expected positive sign for each of 
the specifications, in line with the competitive approach (Table 6). Regional price 
differences thus influence wage differences, so that workers seek to obtain compensation 
to cover the  differences in regional costs of living. This result holds when regional 
housing prices are included in the specification.  
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Table 6 
Regional wages and regional characteristics. 
 I II III IV V 
Price level (log) 0.8154** 1.3313** 1.2655** 1.3817** 1.2889** 
Housing price level(log) 0.1174** 0.0789** 0.0671** 0.0743** 0.0610** 
Amenities      
Coast kilometres (log) - -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0123**
Climatic mildness indicator - -0.0001* -0.002** 0.0001 -0.0002**
Number of cinemas per capita (log) - -0.0707** -0.0562** -0.0753** -0.0614**
Hospital beds per capita (log) - -0.0614** -0.0403** -0.0756** -0.0571**
Physical capital stock (log) - - 0.0120** - 0.0156** 
External competition indicator - - -0.0081** - -0.0087**
Non-agriculture unemployment rate (log)  - - -0.0158** -0.0312**
Trade unions bargaining power indicator - - - 0.0099** 0.0107** 
Note: Estimated coefficients for the variables indicated in the left-hand column when they are included in 
wage equation (3) replacing the regional dummy variables. ** and * indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. These estimates were obtained using Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares as proposed by Rauch (1993). The regional price level for 1995 was calculated 
from the estimates of relative regional price levels by FIES (Alcaide and Alcaide, 1999). The regional 
housing price level was defined as the average price per square meter in 1995 for new housing according to 
the web page of the Ministerio de Fomento. Coast kilometres, the number of cinemas per capita and hospital 
beds per capita were obtained from the Anuario Estadístico de España by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística. The climatic mildness indicator was obtained by applying the methodology proposed in the 
Places Rated Almanac by Boyer and Savageau (1985) using information from the Anuario Estadístico de 
España. The private physical capital stock data for 1995 (excluding agriculture and fishery) in each region 
was obtained from Stock de Capital en España y su distribución territorial (1964-2000) of Fundación 
BBVA. The external competition indicator was defined as the ratio between the imports in each region and its 
Gross Domestic Product in 1995 according to the Contabilidad Regional de España for 1995, prepared by 
the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Regional non-agriculture unemployment rates were calculated as the 
average of the quarterly data for 1995 in the Encuesta de Población Activa, prepared by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística. Finally, the trade unions bargaining power indicator measures the capability of trade 
unions to go on strike. In particular, it is defined as the ratio of workers on strike in each region in the case of 
general strikes during the period 1992-1995 (Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales). 
 
 
Inter-regional wage differences also compensate for the unequal attraction of Spanish 
regions as certain regional characteristics related to the attractiveness of the territories are 
statistically significant and present the signs predicted by compensatory differences theory 
(columns II to V of Table 6). In particular, the advantages associated with a coastal 
location or with a better climate compensate for lower wage incomes. Similarly, leisure 
attractions and health facilities have the same compensatory effect. Thus, a part of the 
Spanish regional wage differences is caused by competitive factors. 
 
Regional productivity differences related to unequal efficiency levels or to the limited 
mobility of some factors might generate wage differences that cannot be attributed to 
competitive mechanisms. As the main determinant of productivity is the accumulation of 
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capital (physical, human and technological), we included some of these factors in the 
specification. As individual human capital is already controlled in equation (4), we only 
considered the influence of the regional private physical stock and the regional 
technological level (R+D expenses). The separate inclusion of these two factors provided 
similar results: both have a positive and significant effect on productivity and regional 
wages.14  
 
The possibility that firms might obtain monopoly rents due to the insufficient competition 
of market products should make it possible for them to pay higher wages (Groshen, 1991). 
Therefore, if the competitive pressure varies between the regions, the rents generated and 
the wages paid might also differ. The results obtained when including an indicator of 
competition in regional product markets in the analysis clearly confirm this effect, as even 
a simple indicator (the ratio between imports and GDP) is significant with the expected 
negative sign.  
 
But imperfections are not limited to market products. In fact, the labour market is 
characterized by a set of regulations and institutional factors that condition the functioning 
of market forces. During the last few decades, theoretical research on wage determination 
mechanisms have highlighted the role of the workers' bargaining power, in particular, that 
of insiders, given the impact of unemployment on the strategy and behaviour of the 
agents.15 According to these models, strong union bargaining power and a low 
unemployment rate will lead to higher wages. The inclusion in the regression of proxy 
variables to reflect both effects confirms this impact: union power (measured as the 
success of strikes) has a positive and significant effect on regional wages, while the 
unemployment rate has a negative effect, regardless of the inclusion of other regional 
characteristics (columns IV and V of Table 6). 
 
                                                          
14 The high bivariate correlation between both variables (0.57) and between these and other variables 
related to regional productivity (firm size, foreign capital presence) suggest that they should not be 
included in the model at the same time due to problems of collinearity. For this reason, we only included 
capital stock.  
 
15 Farber (1986) and Blau and Khan (1999) provide a summary of the literature on the role of trade unions 
in wage determination. The role of unemployment rates on wage levels has been considered in insider-
outsider models (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) and, particularly, in some versions of wage efficiency 
models (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). 
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A negative effect of the unemployment rate on wages is the opposite to what one would 
expect in a competitive framework of wage bargaining, as wages should be higher to 
compensate workers in regions with higher unemployment rates (Harris and Todaro, 
1970). However, a negative relationship best fits the predictions of the aforementioned 
non-competitive theories. The value of the elasticity of wages to the regional 
unemployment rates is -0.03, which is clearly below that of -0.10 that seems to be an 
empirical regularity in developed countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994), and also 
below the estimates for Spain provided by García and Montuenga (2003) and by Sanromá 
and Ramos (2003). This low value could be the effect of certain level of territorial 
aggregation (here NUTS II).  
 
Summarising, the results obtained, and in particular those related to the effect of limited 
competition on market products and institutional factors on the labour markets, provide 
direct evidence of the non-competitive nature of regional wage differences. These results 
suggest that regional wage differences in Spain do not encourage, at least in part, an 
efficient allocation of labour resources. It should also be considered that labour mobility is 
very low in Spain, as inter-regional migrations have responded only very weakly in the 
past to wage differentials and employment opportunities as measured by regional 
unemployment rates (Jimeno and Bentolila, 1998), so that a distinctive feature of the 
Spanish labour market are regional unemployment disparities that tend to persist (Sáez and 
Murillo, 1996).   
 
In order to confirm the influence of collective bargaining on regional wage differences, we 
conducted a final empirical analysis. This analysis consisted of analysing whether the 
variables accounting for regional wage differences also explain regional differences in 
industry minimum wages. If these variables explain regional industry minimum wages, the 
importance of collective bargaining in determining explaining regional wage differences 
would be confirmed. In order to do this, we replaced equation (3) with the following 
model: 
 
  tij = α + Ciδ +Rjβ + Sjγ + ε’’ij           (5) 
 
Where Rj represents the different variables related to the aforementioned characteristics 
of region j. 
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The results of estimating this equation were as expected (Table 7). With the sole 
exceptions of housing prices and leisure attractions, which were no longer statistically 
significant, the explanatory factors of actual wages also accounted for industry minimum 
wages fixed by rounds of collective bargaining. 
 
 
Table 7 
Regional industry minimum wage and regional characteristics 
 I II III IV V 
Price level (log) 1.4304** 1.5646** 1.6425** 1.5575** 1.6382** 
Housing price level(log) 0.0454** 0.0544** 0.0489** 0.0098 0.0090 
Attraction factors      
Coast kilometres (log) - -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001**
Climatic mildness indicator - -0.0007* -0.0005** -0.0007** -0.0008**
Number of cinemas per capita (log) - -0.0332** -0.0140** 0.0294** 0.0268 
Hospital beds per capita (log) - -0.1330** -0.0863** -0.1074** -0.0761**
R+D expenses related to GDP - - 0.0280** - 0.0322** 
External competition indicator - - -0.0566** - -0.0363**
Non-agriculture unemployment rate (log)  - - -0.0972** -0.0698**
Trade unions bargaining power indicator - - - 0.0381** 0.0297** 
Note: Estimated coefficients for the variables indicated in the left-hand column where they are included in the 
wage equation (4) replacing the regional dummy variables. ** and * indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. These estimates have been obtained using 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares as proposed by Rauch (1993). Regional data of R+D expenses related to 
GDP were obtained from Estadísticas sobre actividades de I+D and Contabilidad Regional de España, both 
prepared by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. For the definition and sources of the rest of variables, see 
the Note to Table 6. 
 
 
The results also highlight a number of additional points. First, one difference between 
Tables 6 and 7 is that the physical capital stock has been replaced by R+D expenses. In 
fact, the physical capital stock does not explain adequately the industry minimum wage, 
while R+D expenses are clearly statistically significant. As both variables might reflect the 
effects of productivity differences on wages, this substitution does not seem to be 
particularly relevant16. A second aspect that is worth mentioning is the fact that the 
compensatory variables have the expected signs (with the previously mentioned 
exceptions) and are statistically significant at the usual levels. From this it can be deduced 
                                                          
16 A possible explanation for this result might be that territories (firms) in which activities of R+D are 
significant can guarantee higher wages, which are included in the collective bargaining agreements. 
However, in the other regions (firms), the strategy might be to negotiate wage complements linked to 
productivity, which could increase – if there are no innovations – by introducing physical capital. This 
argument would explain why the industry minimum wage might be related to R+D expenses but not to 
the physical capital stock. It should be pointed out that as there is no empirical evidence supporting the 
argument, this explanation is purely tentative. 
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that in the bargaining process, social agents bear the characteristics of the territory very 
much in mind, so it cannot be claimed that unions distort the bargaining process without 
mentioning that they also give some prominence to certain supply or competitive factors. 
 
A third issue to be emphasised is that the values of the coefficients are, in general, higher 
for the models in which the endogenous variable is the industry minimum wage (Table 7) 
than in those in which the analysed variable are actual wages (Table 6). Furthermore, these  
differences are statistically significant. The elasticity to prices is higher for industry 
minimum wages, which can be interpreted as evidence of an indexation of agreements 
higher than for actual wages. The elasticity of industry minimum wages to external 
competition is also higher, which implies that the framework for the distribution of firms' 
rents is collective bargaining. Finally, the variables related to labour market conditions are 
also more significant for industry minimum wage than they are for actual wages. Thus, 
non-competitive wage determination theories show a greater explanatory capacity for 
bargained wages than for actual wages. This result seems reasonable as actual wages are 
also influenced by individual characteristics that have only been partially controlled by 
individual explanatory variables in the wage equation, and which are translated into a wage 
drift that is totally alien to labour market institutions. 
 
It can be concluded that the same factors - both competitive and non-competitive - that 
account for the industry minimum wage also account for actual wages. For this reason, the 
non-competitive nature of inter-regional wage differences is already present in regional 
collective agreements. In this sense, the role of collective bargaining in determining inter-
regional wage differences is clearly strengthened. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The Spanish economy is characterised by the presence of marked wage differences 
between workers with the same level of skills. These differences are related to regional 
allocation patterns. In practice, inter-regional wage differences are an important factor in 
determining individual wages and are present at all levels of the wage structure, with the 
implication that relative regional wages are very similar for all workers.  
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The existence of inter-regional wage differences for similarly skilled workers challenges 
the possibility that these differences might be explained by different human capital levels 
across the regions. Inter-regional wage differences cannot be fully explained by other 
competitive factors and, as a result, these differences do not contribute to a more efficient 
functioning of the wage setting mechanism and a more efficient Spanish labour market. In 
this line of reasoning, our results show that limited and unequal competition levels in 
product markets and certain restrictions operating on factor accumulation induce regional 
wage differences that hinder an efficient factor allocation at the regional level. 
 
The main contribution of this article is the empirical demonstration that inter-regional 
wage differences are related to the characteristics of the collective bargaining system. The 
evidence reported here reveals that collective bargaining is responsible for the existence of 
such wage differences. Inter-regional differences in actual and bargained wages are 
extremely similar, which indicates that the regional structure of bargained wages at the 
sectoral level is largely the origin of regional wage differences in the Spanish labour 
market. Moreover, the influence of the territory in determining wage levels is more 
important for workers covered by regional sectoral agreements than for workers covered 
by national agreements. This shows that the influence of collective bargaining in 
generating regional wage differences is enhanced by the regional dimension of the system 
in the Spanish case, where sectoral agreements for territories at a level below that of the 
national level predominate. From a comparative perspective, inter-regional wage 
differences in the Spanish labour market are very high. In this sense, our evidence suggests 
that the presence of sectoral agreements at the national level - a common feature in more 
than one European Union country - limits wage flexibility and leads to a lower regional 
wage differentiation. 
 
Finally, the same competitive and non-competitive factors that account for the bargained 
industry minimum wage also determine actual wages, which strengthens the significance 
of  the collective bargaining system in the generation of inter-regional wage differences. 
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